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12.1  Introduction 
The Japanese foreign trade regime was substantially different from its pres- 
ent form until the beginning of  1960s. Before 1949 foreign trade was con- 
trolled directly by  the government, and moreover, there were multiple ex- 
change rates. Although direct control was abolished and a single exchange rate 
was set as a part of the wide range of policies for transition to a market econ- 
omy in 1949, a new system to control foreign trade-the  foreign exchange al- 
location system-was  introduced. The Japanese government could execute a de 
facto import quota through this system. This regime continued to operate until 
trade liberalization progressed under pressure from overseas in the early 1960s. 
It is widely admitted that indirect trade control through the foreign exchange 
allocation system was used as a tool of sectoral industrial policy as well as of 
macroeconomic policy to maintain the balance of payments. For instance, the 
official history of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI et al. 
1994)  states the following: “It [import control] aimed at effective use of limited 
foreign currency to promote economic development, and it allowed necessary 
import goods to be secured, while preventing a rush of imports. Through for- 
eign exchange allocation and approval of imports, MITI could monitor the in- 
dustries under its jurisdiction and carry out the administrative guidance neces- 
sary for their development.” 
Kosai (1989) also considered foreign exchange control a sectoral policy 
measure first of  all. The foreign exchange allocation system generated rents 
by  creating differences between domestic and foreign prices, and it exerted 
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substantial economic and political influence. On one hand, rents generated by 
government intervention have been criticized on the grounds that they cause 
rent-seeking activities by  the private sector, but on the other hand, it has re- 
cently been pointed out that rents can be an effective industrial policy measure 
if  appropriate institutional arrangements are provided (Aoki, Murdock, and 
Okuno-Fujiwara 1996). Taking into account that not a few developing and 
transforming countries have not liberalized their foreign trade, and that they 
face serious rent-seeking problems, we can say that the Japanese experience of 
foreign exchange control has great relevance. 
However, little research has investigated the function of foreign exchange 
allocation from an economic standpoint, although official histories of  MITI 
(MITI et al. 1990) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF 1976) and Inuta (1981), 
by  the author of  MOF (1976), describe the details of  the institution. Kosai 
(1989) only mentions import restrictions on dynamos and passenger cars. Both 
Fukao, Omi, and Eto (1993) and Nakakita (1993) devote only one page to a 
description of the foreign exchange allocation system. Recently, Takagi (1996) 
explained the foreign exchange allocation system in detail and also analyzed 
its function from a macroeconomic standpoint. 
Therefore, in this paper we will analyze the institution and the function of 
foreign exchange allocation in 1950s Japan, focusing on the sectoral and mi- 
croeconomic aspects. In section 12.2 the foreign exchange allocation system 
will be explained briefly. In section 12.3 we  will analyze its operation and 
function concerning macroeconomic aspects and allocation by good. In section 
12.4 the criteria for allocating foreign exchange to firms will be made clear. In 
section 12.5 we will analyze the system’s operation and function concerning 
allocation by firm using firm-level data. Section 12.6 concludes the paper. 
12.2  Foreign Exchange Budget and Foreign Exchange 
Allocation System 
The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Administration Law  (Gaikoku 
Kawase and Gaikoku Boeki Kanri Ho), enacted in December 1949, provided 
a new institutional framework for foreign trade, taking the place of direct gov- 
ernment control. Article 1 of the law prescribed that its purpose was to develop 
normal foreign trade and administer foreign exchange and foreign trade, in 
order to secure balance of  payments, stabilization of the currency value, and 
effective utilization of foreign currency (MOF 1976, 616). It shows that such 
a microeconomic item as the effective use the foreign currency was originally 
included in the purposes of the law. 
For these purposes the law prescribed the concentration of foreign exchange 
and the foreign exchange budget system (gaiku yosun seido).  All foreign cur- 
rency, precious metals, claimable assets in foreign currency, and foreign cur- 
rency securities were to be concentrated in the hands of the government, Bank 
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exchange budget to efficiently use the concentrated foreign currency (Bank of 
Tokyo 1960,2). 
The foreign exchange budget system is explained in Bank of Tokyo (1960), 
Shimada (1960), MOF (1976), Inuta (1981), MITI et al. (1990), and Takagi 
(1996).  We will draw our summary mainly from the outline of the system in 
Bank of Tokyo (1960).  The foreign exchange budget was made starting in Jan- 
uary 1950, at first quarterly and later every half-year. It consisted basically of 
three parts: (1) a summary table, (2)  a foreign exchange budget for import 
goods, and (3) a foreign exchange budget for services, though details of the 
forms differed each term.' In part 1, summary tables of parts 2 and 3, foreign 
exchange rates, and a projection of the balance of payments were shown. 
Part 2 was the core of the foreign exchange budget. It consisted of the budget 
for foreign exchange allocation system (gaika wariate sei) goods (FA goods), 
the budget for automatic approval system (jido  shonin sei) goods (AA goods), 
and the reserve budget.* The division between FA  goods and AA goods was 
crucial. The budget for AA goods was allocated in a lump to the AA group of 
goods, and the import of AA goods was automatically approved as long as the 
budgeted quantity of AA goods had not been reached. In other words, for AA 
goods, import was de fact0 free within the total limit. Accordingly, the liberal- 
ization rate of foreign trade was usually defined as the ratio of the AA goods 
budget to the total budget. 
On the other hand, in order to import FA  goods, one would apply to the 
minister of international trade and industry at each dealing ex ante and would 
receive an allotment of foreign exchange. Moreover, the foreign exchange bud- 
get for FA goods was allocated not in a lump but rather to each good, and the 
minister of international trade and industry would allocate foreign exchange to 
importers within the limit determined for each FA  good. Therefore, for FA 
goods, the quantity of  imports was basically determined by  the foreign ex- 
change budget. This means that the government had wide-ranging powers to 
restrict the quantity of imports. 
The foreign exchange budget was decided by the Cabinet Ministers Council 
(Kakuryo Shingikai), which consisted of the prime minister, the ministers of 
foreign affairs, finance, agriculture and forestry, international trade and indus- 
try, and transportation, and the secretary of the Economic Planning Agen~y.~ 
The draft of the budget for imports and services incidental to imports was made 
by MITI, and the budget for other services was made by MOF)! 
In making the budget for imports, MITI used the estimated amount of for- 
1. A table of budgeted services receipts was also included before the first half of  1953 (MOF 
2. AA goods did not exist at first. There was instead a first come, first served system (senchaku- 
3. The president of the Bank of Japan participated in the council as an advisory member. 
4.  The Trade Bureau of the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) made the whole 
foreign  exchange budget  until the Economic  Stabilization Board  was  abolished in July  1951 
(MITI 1952). 
1976,278-79). 
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eign exchange that could be spent in each term. That amount was calculated 
on the basis of  projected exports, special procurements by  the U.S. Army, 
balance-of-services trade, and targeted balance of payments. MITI allocated 
this amount among AA goods and each FA  good. The import procedure after 
the foreign exchange budget was decided continued with (1) import proclama- 
tion  (yunyu kohyo) by  MITI, (2) import announcement (yunyu happyo)  by 
MITI, (3) foreign exchange allocation by  MITI, (4) import approval (yunyu 
shonin) by foreign exchange banks, (5) letter of credit establishment by foreign 
exchange banks, and (6) import bill settlement by  foreign exchange banks. 
Steps 2 and 3 relate only to FA  goods. 
By import proclamation, lists of AA and FA goods, currency for settlement, 
and areas where certain goods were to be shipped were announced. Because 
import approval by  foreign exchange banks was done directly upon import 
proclamation about AA goods, import proclamation was especially important 
for such  On the other hand, for FA goods, import announcements were 
done separately for each good based on the import proclamation. The import 
announcement specified the place where applications for foreign exchange al- 
lotment should be handed, time limit for application, applicant’s qualifications, 
the foreign exchange allocation criterion (gaika shikin wariate kzjun), and so 
forth. The foreign exchange allocation criteria provided the rules by which for- 
eign exchange was allocated to individual firms, as will be discussed in sec- 
tion 12.4. 
According to the import announcement, each firm that wanted to import 
FA  goods handed an application for foreign exchange allocation (gaika shikin 
wariate shinseisho) to MITI. MITI decided on the allocation of  foreign ex- 
change to each applicant by reference to the budget and to the foreign exchange 
allocation criteria. Then, if the minister of international trade and industry de- 
cided to allocate the foreign exchange, a foreign exchange allocation certificate 
(gaika  shikin wariate shorneisho), valid for four months, was delivered to the 
applicant (Shimada 1960, 170). 
12.3  Movement of the Foreign Exchange Budget 
and Its Allocation by Good 
12.3.1  The Macroeconomy and the Foreign Exchange Budget 
The exchange rate of the yen and the trend of the balance of payments for 
the 1950s and 1960s are summarized in figure 12.1. Japan, which had shifted 
from a regime of plural exchange rates to a regime of single exchange rate in 
April 1949, maintained a fixed exchange rate of 360 yen per dollar until August 
1971. Change in the real exchange rate measured by export goods should be 
noted, however. The real exchange rate appreciated rapidly in the early 1950s, 
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Fig. 12.1  Exchange rates and balance of payments 
and it remained above 360 yen per dollar until the end of  1950s. After staying 
a little lower than 360 yen per dollar for several years, it depreciated rapidly in 
the latter half of the 1960s. While even in 1949 the yen was said to be overval- 
ued, inflation during the Korean War increased the degree of  overvaluation. 
Until the first half of  the 1960s the Japanese economy frequently faced large 
current account deficits (fig. 12.1), while there remained large latent unem- 
ployment. These facts suggest that the rate of 360 yen per dollar was higher 
than the equilibrium level until the first half of the 1960s. In fact, according to 
(admittedly fragmentary) data on the black market rate of the yen in the 1950s 
surveyed by  the Bank of Japan, the black market rate was over 400 yen per 
dollar (fig. 12.2). Overvaluation of the yen formed the macroeconomic back- 
ground for the adoption of the foreign exchange budget system. 
The first column of table 12.1 reports the total foreign exchange budget. The 
foreign exchange budget tightened from 1954 to the first half of 1955 and then 
expanded rapidly from the latter half of 1955. It tightened again from the first 
half of  1957 to 1958, and then a long expansion started in 1959. The back- 
ground of these changes in the foreign exchange budget scale was as follows. 
The purpose of  tightening in  1954 was to cope with the current account 
deficit of  1953 (fig. 12.1). In the foreign exchange budget of  1954, the budget 
for "nonessential" goods was cut, and a policy of  substituting domestic raw 
materials for imported raw  materials was pursued, while the budget for raw 
materials used in the processing trade and for raw materials whose prices were 
rising rapidly was expanded (Bank of  Tokyo 1960, 215-17).  The current ac- 
count recovered in 1954, and a surplus was expected to continue for the time 316  Tetsuji Okazaki and Takafumi Korenaga 
ycddollar 
Fig. 12.2  Black market rate of yen 
Source:  Bank of Japan, Bureau of Foreign Exchange, Kuwuse Boeki Geppo (Monthly bulletin of 
foreign exchange and trade; Tokyo, various issues). 
being. Taking this situation into account, from 1955 to 1956 the government 
pursued a policy of large foreign exchange budgets in order to support the 
expansion of exports and production (Bank of Tokyo 1960,218-23). 
However, in early  1957 the balance of  payments turned to deficit, and a 
confrontation over the policy of  making the foreign exchange budget  took 
place among the relevant authorities. MITI insisted that large foreign exchange 
budgets should be continued, coupled with a tightening of fiscal policy, on the 
grounds that contraction of  the budget would cause speculative advances in 
prices and a decline in exports. On the other hand, MOF and the Bank of Japan 
stressed the necessity of reducing imports directly by reducing the foreign ex- 
change budget as well as by tightening fiscal policy, because the balance-of- 
payments deficit was quite serious. Consequently, the foreign exchange budget 
for imports for the first half of 1957 was set at a level slightly below that of the 
previous term (Bank of Japan 1957.1-a, 1-4). 
In making the foreign exchange budget for the latter half of  1957, MITI 
and MOF agreed that under the circumstances of a large balance-of-payments 
deficit, the scale of the budget should be reduced as long as possible. Although 
there remained disagreement between the two ministries about projected re- 
ceipts, the foreign exchange budget for the latter half of 1957 was substantially 
smaller than that of the previous term (Bank of Japan 1957.11-a, 1-5). 
The balance of payments turned to surplus in the latter half of  1957, which 
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Table 12.1  Outline of the Foreign Exchange Budget (millions of dollars) 
Year  Total  FA  AA 
1952  1,242  763  348 
1,501  988  494 
1953  1,237  799  300 
1,546  1,250  274 
1954  1,100  93  1  141 
1,090  913  175 
1955  1,160  970  190 
1,454  1,218  236 
1956  1,765  1,413  352 
2,483  1,969  513 
1957  2,236  1,589  497 
1,652  1,242  330 
1958  1,628  1,148  330 
1,757  1,161  470 
1959  1,941  1,217  630 
2,328  1,581  700 
1960  2,624  1,459  1,000 
2,800  1,480  1,150 
1961  3,272  1,422  1,850 
3,526  1,526  1,800 
1962  3,114  1,264  1,650 
3,154  774  2,380 
1963  3,465  796  2,575 
3,815  705  2,860 

















































Sources:  Bank of Japan, Gaikokukawase Binran (Handbook of  foreign exchange; Tokyo, n.d.); 
Bank of Japan (various dates-a). 
However, this time MITI requested the compression of the budget in order to 
adjust demand and supply in each industry.  Although MOF and the Economic 
Planning Agency insisted that from the standpoint of  the long-term economic 
plan, the foreign exchange budget should be expanded, the foreign exchange 
budget for the first half of  1958 was even smaller than that for the previous 
term.6  As to the foreign exchange budget of the latter half of  1958, the indus- 
trial societies requested that the scale be reduced, and it was not expanded 
substantially (Bank of Japan 1958.1-a, 1-4). After the latter half of 1958, as the 
Japanese economy entered a large boom with a surplus in the balance of pay- 
ments, the foreign exchange budget increased until  1961 (Bank of  Tokyo 
Next, let us consider the allocation of the foreign exchange budget between 
AA goods and FA  goods (table 12.1). The ratio of the AA budget to the total 
1960,229-31). 
6. MITI’s Bureau of International Trade assumed that it was necessary to expand the foreign 
exchange budget, projecting a business recovery, but the bureaus in charge of  the industries in- 
sisted on reducing the foreign exchange budget in order to stimulate recovery (Bank of Japan 
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budget (import liberalization ratio) fell below 20 percent in 1953.  After a grad- 
ual recovery from 1956, it rose rapidly in the early 1960s. From 1953, under 
the tightening of the total foreign exchange budget, several goods that had been 
classified as AA goods, such as raw  cotton, iron ore, and crude sugar, were 
converted to FA goods (Inuta 1981,181). In making the foreign exchange bud- 
get for the first half of 1957, the government adopted a policy of increasing the 
number of AA  goods and decided in future not to convert AA goods to FA 
goods in response to balance-of-payments situations (Bank of  Tokyo  1960, 
221). Then the recovery of convertibility of European currency at the end of 
1958 spurred trade liberalization in Japan. In making the foreign exchange 
budget for the first half of  1959, the Japanese government decided to promote 
trade liberalization, and in June 1960 the cabinet agreed on the Liberalization 
Plan of Trade and Foreign Exchange (Boeki Kawase Jiyuka Keikaku Taiko), 
which announced that the liberalization ratio would be raised to 80 percent in 
three years. The rapid increase in the liberalization ratio in the early 1960s was 
based on this plan.’ 
12.3.2  Allocation of the Foreign Exchange Budget 
by Good and Generation of Rents 
The foreign exchange budget for FA  goods was allocated to each good as 
explained in  section 12.2. Table  12.2 shows the composition of  the foreign 
exchange budget by large item. Foods and textiles had the largest weights, but 
their weights were decreasing. On the other hand, the weights of  petroleum, 
machinery, and raw materials of steel increased. It can be said that changes in 
the composition of the foreign exchange budget basically reflected changes in 
the industrial structure. However, examining the changes in detail, we find that 
there existed various policy factors. Hereafter, we are going to examine alloca- 
tion of the FA  budget by  good from the latter half of  1956 to the first half of 
1958 (detailed information on the making of  the foreign exchange budget is 
available in unpublished materials from the Bank of Japan). Raw cotton, wool, 
steel and its raw materials, petroleum, and machinery, which were items with 
comparatively large budget allocations, will be considered (table 12.3). 
Raw Cotton 
Allocation of  the foreign exchange budget  to raw  cotton was  based on 
MITI’s demand and supply plan for cotton products. Necessary production of 
cotton products was calculated from estimated demand for cotton products and 
estimated changes in stocks. And the level of production determined the neces- 
sary level of raw  cotton imports, which in turn, together with the estimated 
import price of raw cotton, determined the necessary foreign exchange budget 
(Bank of  Japan  1956.11-b,  113-20).  The budget  for the latter half  of  1956 
7. On the process of  trade liberalization, see Takagi (1996, 20-30). Table 12.2  Allocation of FA  Budget of Foreign Exchange by Good I 
(percent of total FA  budget) 
Good  1953  1954  1955  1956  1957  1958  1959 
Foods  31.32  29.01  25.96  16.15  18.35  19.47  14.44 
Government monopoly goods  0.98  1.03  1.12  0.67  0.49  0.97  0.87 
Lumber  0.00  1.72  0.89  0.79  0.46  0.89  1.77 
Materials of daily necessaries  0.57  1.70  2.22  1.57  1.49  1.42  1.49 
Textiles  32.72  31.59  29.26  23.81  26.76  27.65  25.40 
Materials of fertilizer  1.92  2.23  2.22  1.93  1.34  1.37  1.23 
Coal  2.47  2.71  2.93  3.34  4.65  3.47  3.42 
Materials of steel  2.16  3.77  8.21  15.88  12.61  4.28  7.43 
Nonferrous metals  0.46  1.60  1.71  5.13  3.31  2.29  3.34 
Petroleum  5.73  7.44  7.24  6.66  7.26  11.77  10.96 
Chemicals  0.55  0.38  0.33  0.44  0.72  0.87  0.98 
Medicines  0.60  0.37  0.28  0.17  0.24  0.27  0.27 
Machinery  10.45  5.67  7.87  15.45  12.01  11.82  15.91 
Other  10.06  10.79  9.77  8.01  10.32  13.46  12.49 
Source: Bank of Tokyo (1960). 
Table 12.3  Allocation of FA  Budget of Foreign Exchange by Good I1 
(thousands of dollars) 
1957 
1956  1958 
Good  Oct-Mar  Apr-Sept  Oct-Mar  Apr-Sept 
Staple foods  186,025  122,034  177,244  142,513 
Soybean  48,105  48,000  33,600  40,425 
sugar  65,057  89,706  47,486  54,000 
salt  6,294  5,042  4,942  5,100 
Lumber  12,360  6,942  6,000  10,662 
Beef tallow  14,330  13,338  10,350  11,000 
Hides  8,250  11,150  12,050  11,382 
Raw cotton  198,122  216,275  215,300  204,639 
Wool  121,000  124,800  141,500  73,500 
Pulp for chemical fiber  10,626  14,370  7,010  7,752 
Phosphorus ore  10,538  9,123  8,605  6,868 
Potash  30,507  20,807  16,330  16,320 
Raw materials for steel  159,810  288,503  68,500  57,400 
Coal  57,683  82,237  49,363  38,777 
Petroleum  104,982  103,616  93,470  141,000 
Machinery  146,000  190,000  150,000  123,000 
Source: Bank of Japan (1956.11-1958.1-h). 320  Tetsuji Okazaki and Takafumi Korenaga 
served the interests of the cotton-spinning industry, especially of large enter- 
prises, which had requested a reduction in raw cotton imports in order to sup- 
port cotton product prices (1956.11-b, 123). Concerning the budget for the first 
half of  1957, the cotton-spinning industry again requested a reduction in raw 
cotton imports, but because the margin of  the cotton-spinning industry was 
rather high, MITI did not agree and increased the foreign exchange budget 
allocation (1957.1-b, 80). However, in the first half of 1957, the actual amount 
of foreign exchange allotment was far below budget, in order to reduce the 
output of cotton products, and the import quantity budgeted for the latter half 
of  1957 was even smaller than that for the latter half of  1956 (1957.JI-b, 94- 
95). Moreover, the budget allocation to raw cotton in the first half of  1958 was 
curtailed substantially to  support production cutbacks under administrative 
guidance (1958.I-b, 94-95). 
Wool 
Allocation of  the foreign exchange budget to wool was based on MITI’s 
demand and supply plan for wool products. Necessary production of wool 
products was calculated from estimated demand for wool products and esti- 
mated changes in stocks. And the level of production determined the necessary 
level of wool imports, which in turn, together with the estimated import price 
of  wool, determined the necessary foreign exchange budget (Bank of  Japan 
1956.11-b, 130-34).  Allocation of  the foreign exchange budget to wool was 
expanded from the latter half of  1956 to cope with an increase in domestic 
demand for wool products. The government aimed at reducing both the domes- 
tic price of wool products and the rents generated by the difference between 
the domestic and import prices of wool (1956.11-b, 136). Also in the first half 
of 1957, a large amount of the budget was allocated to wool (1957.1-b, 85-86), 
but the actual amount of foreign exchange allocation was cut in order to reduce 
the output of wool products. Allocation of the foreign exchange budget to wool 
in the latter half of  1957 and the first half of  1958 was compressed to support 
this production reduction (1956.II-b, 105). 
Steel and Its Raw Materials 
Allocation of the foreign exchange budget to steel and its raw materials (iron 
ore, scrap iron, and pig iron) was based on MITI’s demand and supply plan for 
steel. To cope with the rapid increase in steel demand due to the expansion of 
investment, allocation of the foreign exchange budget to steel and its raw mate- 
rials was increased in the latter half of  1956 and the first half of  1957 (Bank 
of Japan 1956.11-b, 174-75). Because there was a bottleneck in blast furnace 
capacity, a large amount of the budget was allocated to scrap, pig iron, steel 
ingots, and steel products (1957.I-b, 135-39). In the latter half of 1957, alloca- 
tion of  the budget was substantially reduced because of  a decrease in steel 
demand (1957.11-b,  159-61).  As the decline in  steel prices became serious, 
production cutbacks of  crude steel and  some kinds of  steel products were 321  The Foreign Exchange Allocation Policy in Postwar Japan 
started under administrative guidance by MITI in March 1958. Corresponding 
to this measure, MITI curtailed the production plan for steel of the first half of 
1958, and reduced the allocation of the foreign exchange budget to steel and 
its raw materials (1958.1-b, 133-34). 
Petroleum 
Allocation of  the  foreign exchange budget  to petroleum  was  based  on 
MITI’s  demand and supply plan for petroleum products. Demand levels for 
heavy oil, volatile oil, kerosene, and light oil, respectively, were estimated, and 
from these estimates the necessary levels of imports of crude oil and petroleum 
products were calculated. Under the domestic refinement principle, MITI gave 
priority to imports of  crude oil. However, because demand for heavy oil was 
especially large in Japan, a substantial amount of the foreign exchange budget 
was allocated to heavy oil (Bank of Japan 1956.II-b, 208-9).  In the first half 
of  1957, the budget for crude oil and heavy oil was increased because of  a 
serious shortage of  water and coal for generating electricity (1957.1-b, 171- 
72). Moreover, MITI guided petroleum companies to make long-term contracts 
for chartering tankers to cope with the shortage of tankers caused by the Suez 
Crisis. For the latter half of  1957, allocation of  the foreign exchange budget 
to petroleum was  suppressed because of  a projected slowdown in demand 
growth, which in turn caused a problem of  excessive chartering (1957.11-b, 
189-91). Then, in the first half of 1958, a large amount of the foreign exchange 
budget was allocated to petroleum as a countermeasure to the excessive char- 
tering problem (1958.1-b, 159-60). 
Machinery 
For machinery, foreign exchange allocation according to a demand and sup- 
ply plan was impossible because of the great variety of machinery. MITI’s Bu- 
reau of  International Trade (Tsusho-kyoku) adjusted the budget claims from 
each bureau of MITI and each ministry, based on surveys of machinery demand 
in each industry under their jurisdiction (Bank of  Japan 1956.11-b, 220-22). 
The claims from the bureaus of MITI and other ministries are shown in table 
12.4. In the latter half of  1956, large amounts of machinery imports were re- 
quested by such sectors as steel, machinery, transportation, and electricity be- 
cause of rapid investment increases. MITI chose to keep the foreign exchange 
budget for machinery at almost the same level as the previous term (1957.I-b, 
179), thus denying about 10 percent of the demand (table 12.4). Concerning 
allocation of the foreign exchange budget to machinery, machinery users were 
inclined to prefer imported machinery on the grounds of high quality, availabil- 
ity of  loans at low interest rates from manufacturers, and quick delivery. On 
the other hand, domestic machinery producers insisted that domestic machin- 
ery should be used as much as possible. MITI’s goal was to maintain a balance 
between encouragement of the domestic machinery industry and rationaliza- 
tion of the user industries (1956.11-b, 223-24). 322  Tetsuji Okazaki and Takafumi Korenaga 
Table 12.4  Claims for Foreign Exchange Budget for Machinery by Ministries 
and Agencies (thousands of dollars) 
~ 
Ministry or Agency 
1957 
1956  1958 
Oct-Mar  Apr-Sept  Oct-Mar  Apr-Sept 
Total  157,430  288,661  193,529  189,461 
(ratio of actual allotment, %)  (92.72)  (65.82)  (77.51)  (64.92) 
Bureau of Heavy Industry, MITI  66,382  119,689  54,222  88,202 
Bureau of Textile, MITI  22,946  16,780  15,285  10,234 
Bureau of Light Industry, MlTI  11,159  24,967  19,000  12,939 
Bureau of Enterprise, MITI  9,813  10,917  502  18,135 
Bureau of Mining, MlTI  9,745  11,362  8,968  9,159 
Bureau of Public Utility, MITI  7,615  31,886  1,450  3,207 
Bureau of Coal, MITI  n.a.  n.a.  2,330  2,329 
Ministry of  Transportation  n.a.  45,921  15,752  11,493 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry  5,874  12,041  4,845  6,535 
Agency of Defense  5,686  4,999  4,9 I8  2.6 15 
Ministry of Construction  n.a.  2,952  1,95  1  4,550 
Agency of  Science and Technology  n.a.  2,357  4,147  1,439 
Ministry of Health and Welfare  n.a.  n.a.  1,000  1,148 
Other  18,210  4,790  56,203  16,576 
Source:  Bank  of Japan (1956.11-1958.1-b). 
Ministry of  Finance  n.a.  n.a.  1,956  500 
Ministry of Education  n.a.  n.a.  1  ,000  400 
In the first half of  1957, although demand for machinery was still large, 
MITI denied 34 percent of the claims, expecting investment to be postponed 
because of constraints on raising funds. In making the foreign exchange bud- 
get, MITI’s Bureau of  Heavy Industry called for a reduction in the budget, 
while the Bureau of International Trade believed that there was room to in- 
crease the budget (1957.1-b, 188-90). This confrontation between the two bu- 
reaus reflected the above-mentioned problem of balance. 
In the latter half of 1957, MITI denied 22 percent of the claims (table 12.4), 
on the grounds that the effects of the tight monetary policy would gradually be 
felt and that investment for rationalization of industries had peaked because of 
the rapid increase in machine imports in the past two to three years (1957.11-b, 
198-99).  Moreover, in the first half of  1958, the foreign exchange budget for 
machinery was reduced to its lowest level since the latter half of 1955. Protec- 
tion of domestic producers was one reason (1958.1-b, 173-75). 
The above discussion shows that in the cases of raw materials, MITI’s de- 
mand and supply plan for each good was used as a base. It also shows that 
there were often cases in which allocation of the foreign exchange budget was 
restrained for purposes of  industrial policy. Because restraint of  the foreign 
exchange budget for FA  goods constituted a de facto import quota, as stressed 
in section 12.2, it is probable that for many FA goods rents were generated. 323  The Foreign Exchange Allocation Policy in Postwar Japan 
We  can roughly measure the scale of rents by subtracting the tariff from the 
difference between the domestic and import prices of each good. We estimated 
the scale of  rents for 27  goods whose weights were relatively high in the 
wholesale price statistics (compiled by  the Bank of  Japan) and whose c.i.f. 
import prices are available in  the customs clearance statistics (compiled by 
MOF). The results are shown in table 12.5. For 15 of  27 goods, rents were 
Table 12.5  Estimation of Rents (yen) 
Domestic  Import 
Price  c.i.f. Price  Tariff  B + C  AID 
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Sources: Bank of Japan, Oroshiuri Bukka Tokei Nenpo (Statistical yearbook of wholesale prices; Tokyo, 
1955); MOE Gaikoku Boeki Nenpyo (Yearbook of  international trade; Tokyo, 1955); MOF, Import Tariffs 
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generated. The rents were especially large for automobiles, volatile oil, refined 
wheat, wool, and flow8 
12.4  Criteria for Foreign Exchange Allocation 
and Methods of Allocation by Firm 
Allocation of foreign exchange to firms meant allocation of the rents gener- 
ated import restriction. Therefore, there is a substantial possibility that alloca- 
tion of foreign exchange to firms caused rent-seeking activities in the private 
sector and corruption of the bureaucracy and political circle. At the same time, 
however, it might be an effective tool of industrial policy. Concerning the first 
possibility, some then-bureaucrats of MITI talked in retrospect about the strong 
political pressures MITI faced with respect to foreign exchange allocation. 
One of them, who served as chief of the Budget Section (Yosan-ka) of the In- 
ternational Trade Bureau in the 1950s, said that he daily received petitions and 
requests from Diet members, and that resisting these pressures was one main 
role of  the chief of  the Budget Section. Moreover, another then-bureaucrat, 
who was a vice-chief of the International Trade Bureau in the 1950s, said that 
several Diet members came regularly to the vice-minister’s office to petition 
about the foreign exchange allo~ation.~ 
Certain mechanisms to evade such political pressures were prepared in the 
foreign exchange allocation system, the outline of which was sketched in sec- 
tion 12.2. MITI took the course of reducing the range of its discretion as much 
as possible concerning the allocation of foreign exchange to each firm, as is 
discussed in Okazaki and Ishii (1996). The manual of  the foreign exchange 
allocation system, which was written by the authorities at MITI in 1960, states: 
“Although foreign exchange allocation is prescribed to be at the Minister of 
International Trade and Industry’s discretion in the Foreign Exchange and In- 
ternational Trade Administration Law, it does not imply that the Minister deter- 
mines the allotment case by case arbitrarily. MITI determines a certain crite- 
rion concerning each good, by reference to the purpose of  classifying it as an 
FA good, and allots the foreign exchange mechanically or screens the applica- 
tions according to the criterion” (Shimada 1960, 158). 
It can be said that MITI intended to restrain rent seeking by  reducing the 
room  for  discretion through  the  definition  of  clear  allocation criteria  an- 
8. It was widely recognized that the foreign exchange allocation system generated rents. E.g., 
Amaya, a vice-chief of MITI’s Planning Section, states, “The foreign exchange allocation system 
promoted the accumulation of capital for two reasons, that is, restriction of international competi- 
tion and giving premiums to firms that were allotted the foreign exchange” (1955, 51-52).  And 
Toshiyuki Miyauchi, a managing director of Itochu Co., criticized the system at the 1959 meeting 
of the Association of Corporate Executives, “So far the foreign exchange allocation system has 
been at the center of the industrial policy, but such a distorted situation, in which import premiums 
exist, is not appropriate when the European currencies have recovered convertibility” (Okazaki et 
al. 1996, 127). 
9. Interview by the Research Institute of Industrial Policy History. 325  The Foreign Exchange Allocation Policy in Postwar Japan 
Table 12.6  Methods and Criteria for Foreign Exchange Allocation by Firm, 
Latter Half of 1956 








Pulp for chemical fiber 
Phosphorus ore 
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Criteria set by the consuming industry based on actual 
consumption in the first half of 1955, actual allocation 
in the first half of 1956, and desirable allocation 
Actual imports in 1955 
Criteria set by the trade associations of the sugar refining 
industry based on production capacity, actual 
production, and per firm rate 
Actual imports from July 1955 to June 1956 
Actual imports from July 1955 to June 1956 
Actual exports (export link), actual consumption in the 




Actual exports (export link) 
Actual exports (export link) and production capacity 
Actual exports (export link) and production capacity 
Actual exports (export link) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Actual production and production plan 
Actual foreign exchange allotment and actual imports 
Actual foreign exchange allotment and actual imports 
Individual screening by the Council of Machinery 
in the past three years 
in the past three years 
Import Allotment 
~~~ 
Source: Bank of Japan (1956.n-b). 
“TO,  allocation to  trading company on order; AT,  allocation to trading company; ATN,  allocation to 
trading company on notification; AC, allocation to consuming company. 
nounced beforehand. “A  certain criterion” in the quotation above is the foreign 
exchange allocation criterion specified by the import announcement (see sec- 
tion 12.2).  The foreign exchange allocation criteria for major goods in the latter 
half of  1956 are presented in table 12.6. There were four allocation methods: 
allocation to a trading company (shosha wariate, AT), allocation to a consum- 
ing company (juyosha wariate, AC), allocation to a trading company on order 
(hacchusho hosiki shosha wariate, ATO), and allocation to a trading company 
on notification (naijisho hoshiki shosha wariate, ATN). 
The AT  method allocated foreign exchange based only on the conditions of 
trading companies, past import records in many cases; it was used for some 
sugar imports, lumber, and some beef  tallow imports, among others (table 
12.6). The underlying view was that past import results showed a company’s 326  Tetsuji Okazaki and Takafumi Korenaga 
ability to achieve imports and this method would contribute to long-term im- 
port trade relationships (Shimada 1960, 178). Under this method rents were 
acquired by the trading companies. 
In the AC method, foreign exchange was allocated directly to the companies 
that used the import goods. The AT0 method was based on purchase orders 
put out to trading companies by user companies, and ATN was a kind of AT0 
in which MITI notified each user company beforehand of the order limit. In 
the AC, ATN, and AT0 methods, the condition of each user company-export 
record, production capacity, and production-was  used as the criterion (table 
12.6).’O Specifically, the use of criteria based on export records like those for 
raw cotton, wool, and pulp for chemical fiber was called the “export link sys- 
tem” (  yushutsu rinku-sei). Under the AC, ATN, and AT0 methods, rents were 
acquired by the user companies. 
It is notable that in many cases the criteria were based on clear and objective 
conditions. This fact is the point of the quotation from Shimada (1960) above.I1 
It also supports the view of “creating contests” of World Bank (1993). The main 
point of this view is that the another type of competition-contest-based  com- 
petition with clear rules, referees, and rewards-works  in the East Asian coun- 
tries, including Japan. In the foreign exchange allocation system, the rents ob- 
tained by receiving allocations were attractive rewards for private companies. 
To obtain more rewards, companies had to win competitions to achieve perfor- 
mance, the rules of which were the allocation criteria. MITI played the role of 
referee, mechanically and strictly applying the criteria-that  is, the rules. 
In addition, it is notable that these criteria are thought to have led corporate 
behavior in  specific directions. The cases of  export-based and production- 
capacity-based criteria have special significance. In the former case, rents from 
foreign exchange allotment are thought to have played the role of  an export 
subsidy. In the latter case, it is thought that investment was promoted by  the 
rents, which functioned as investment subsidies. 
These effects were clearly recognized by the people concerned in those days. 
MITI intentionally used the export link system to promote exports. For in- 
stance, Shimada states, “It is an effective export promotion measure” (1960, 
179-80).  Nishimura (1955), a bureaucrat of MOF, states that the background 
of the introduction of the export link system to textiles in the early 1950s was 
a decrease in exports caused by  a rise in domestic prices, and that the rapid 
increase in textile exports in  1953-54  was  due mainly to the effects of  the 
export link system. All of  the examples of the export link system shown in 
table 12.6 allocate foreign exchange for raw materials based on the export per- 
10.  As there was quite a wide variety of machinery, it was impossible to adopt such an objective 
criterion. Therefore, the Council of Machinery Import Allotment (Yunyu Kikai Wariate Shingikai) 
under MITI determined an allotment for each application through a screening process referring to 
industrial policy, trade policy, and social policy. The council consisted of the staffs of the Budget 
Section and the Import Section of the Bureau of Trade, the sections in charge of machinery indus- 
tries, and the sections in charge of user industries (Bank of Japan 1956.II-b, 219). 
11. It will be tested quantitatively in the next section. 327  The Foreign Exchange Allocation Policy in Postwar Japan 
formance of products made with those raw materials. This method was called 
the “raw materials link system” (genzairyo rinku-sei). In addition, foreign ex- 
change for raw materials could be allotted based on the export performance of 
products that had  no input-output relation to those raw  materials; this was 
called the “deficit-covering link system” (shukketsu hosho rinku-sei; Nishi- 
mura 1955). 
The deficit-covering link system was applied to the exports of ships, produc- 
tion plants, whale oil, raw  silk, and canned food, among others, in 1953-54 
(Ekonomisto 33, no. 7  [1955]:  17-21).  The companies that  exported those 
goods were allotted foreign exchange to import crude sugar. They acquired a 
de facto export subsidy by selling the crude sugar to sugar-refining companies 
at the higher domestic price. The shipbuilding industry especially enjoyed the 
benefits of this system. It enabled shipbuilders to cut export prices and conse- 
quently spurred the first export boom of ships in 1953-54. The deficit-covering 
link system was strongly criticized by  the International Monetary Fund‘s re- 
search mission in 1954, and it was abolished in 1955. The criticism from over- 
seas suggests that this system had large export promotion effects. 
In contrast, the criteria based on production capacity were not intended to 
promote investment but to level the capacity utilization ratio. However, it was 
recognized that they had the effect of  investment promotion. A bureaucrat at 
MITI wrote in a 1956 article, “The companies invested aiming at an increase 
in the amount of  the import quota, because the method of foreign exchange 
allocation is based on the amount of equipment” (Hiramatsu 1956). Moreover, 
the Oriental Economist commented, “The overinvestment in such industries as 
textiles, sugar refining, and milling is mainly due to the raw materials allotment 
policy of the government based on equipment capacity” (Toyo Keizai Shinpo 
2604 [1953]: 15). 
12.5  A Quantitative Analysis of Foreign Exchange Allocation 
by Firm: The Wool-Spinning Industry 
12.5.1  A Brief History of the Wool-Spinning Industry 
The Japanese wool-spinning industry contracted substantially during World 
War  11.  Although its equipment was reconstructed in  accordance with  the 
equipment restoration plan approved by the occupation authority in 1948, raw 
material imports were a crucial constraint on the recovery of the industry (Tex- 
tile Society of Japan 1958,310-13).  Imports of wool were very low for a few 
years after the war because imports of  raw materials in general were under 
strict constraint and priority was given to raw cotton among the textile materi- 
als. It was not until 1949, when the trade agreement was concluded between 
sterling area nations, that wool imports got back on track (Wool Spinning As- 
sociation of Japan 1987,92). 
Meanwhile, wool imports were shifted to private trade from state trade at 
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allotment of  the foreign exchange for wool import from January to March 
1950”  (Showa 25-nen I-3-gatu  yomo yunyu  shikin  wariate saimoku), the 
substance of  which  was  that  the  total  foreign exchange budget  for  wool 
($9,613,000) would be divided into two parts: one for domestic demand (70 
percent) and the other for export (30 percent). The former was allocated ac- 
cording to the production capacity of each firm, while the latter was allocated 
according to the export record of  each firm (Wool Spinning Association of 
Japan  1987, 94, appendix 24-25).  It is notable that both export records and 
production capacity were already in use as criteria. 
In July 1950 an important revision in the method of  allocation was intro- 
duced. In the method adopted in January 1950,  the amounts of foreign exchange 
for export and domestic demand, respectively, were set beforehand; however, 
after July 1950, foreign exchange was preferentially allocated according to ex- 
port records, with the remaining part allotted by considering production capac- 
ity for domestic demand (MITI 1950).12  The method after July 1950 is gener- 
ally called the export link system of wool (Textile Society of Japan 1958,321). 
The method of  allocation was revised frequently after that. In particular, 
important revisions were made in August 1953 and April 1955. Before August 
1953 foreign exchange was allocated ex post in accordance with past export 
records; after August 1953 it was allotted ex ante according to the export plan 
of each firm and was adjusted subsequently in line with actual exports. At the 
same time another system, “achievement rewards” (suiko hosho), was intro- 
duced; it was related to the above revisions in order to increase export incen- 
tives.I3 Under this system, additional foreign exchange was allocated to each 
firm according to the achievement ratio of its export plan. The revision in April 
1955 was  needed to cope with problems caused by  the  1953 revision. The 
method adopted in 1953 greatly stimulated exports. It was criticized by foreign 
countries and gave rise to a shortage of wool in the domestic market. Therefore, 
in April 1955, export incentives were reduced by abolishing the achievement 
rewards and decreasing the ratio of foreign exchange allocation to exports of 
each firm (Textile Society of Japan 1958,325-26). 
These methods and actual allocation were determined by  the Hemp and 
Wool  Section (Mamo-ka) until fiscal year  1955 and by  the Silk, Wool  and 
Chemical Fiber Section (Gnu Ke Kasen-ka) thereafter, both of MITI’s Bureau 
of Textile. We found an almost complete collection of original documents con- 
cerning the foreign exchange allocation for wool imports made by those sec- 
tions of MITI. Moreover, in those materials firm-level records of exports and 
production capacity are also available. Hereafter, we will quantify the foreign 
exchange allocation method at the firm level and then analyze the effects of 
the method. 
12. The ratio of the amount of foreign exchange allotment to the amount of exports differed 
13. For details, see Wool Spinning Association of Japan (1987, 104-6, appendix 58-63). 
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Table 12.7  Determination of Foreign Exchange Allocation for Wool Imports 
by Firm 
Export  Production  Sample Size 
Performance  Capacity  Adjusted  (number of 
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Note; Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
12.5.2  The Rule of Foreign Exchange Allocation and 
Measurement of Marginal Rent 
First, we regress the amount of foreign exchange (in yen) allocated to each 
firm on the firm's amount of actual exports (in yen) for the previous term and 
equipment capacity (in physical units) using cross-sectional data in order to 
examine how foreign exchange allocation was linked to these variables (table 
12.7). The sample firms are those with available data concerning foreign ex- 
change allotment, exports, and production capacity.I4 The data are taken from 
the original documents at MITI. 
The coefficients of both the export (a)  and the equipment capacity (p) vari- 
ables show how much foreign exchange is additionally allocated given growth 
in the exports and increase in the equipment capacity of each firm. As indicated 
by  the high adjusted R2, the foreign exchange allocation to each firm is ex- 
plained fully by its export performance and equipment capacity. This implies 
that foreign exchange was  allocated to each firm  according to the clear and 
objective rules discussed in the previous section. Moreover, it is notable that 
the movement of the coefficient a  reflects the above-mentioned revision of the 
14. In regard to the foreign exchange allocation to production capacity, production capacity in 
each firm was counted by mule-conversion unit (mule-kunzun mi) before the latter half of  1954 
but by real unit (jirsu mi) after the first half of  1955 (Wool Spinning Association of Japan 1987, 
107-8). In the regression we use the unit actually adopted during each term. 330  Tetsuji Okazaki and Takafumi Korenaga 
Fig. 12.3  Difference between domestic and import prices of wool 
allocation method; that is, the rise in a  from the first half of  1953 to the first 
half of  1955 roughly corresponds to the introduction of  the new distribution 
method in August 1953. The method itself increases the allocation of foreign 
exchange to exports on a per yen basis. 
Besides the coefficient a,  the difference between the domestic and foreign 
prices of wool affects the size of the incentive to export as well as investment 
under the foreign exchange allotment system. We  take the domestic price of 
wool (e)  from the wholesale price statistics of the Bank of Japan and its im- 
port price (P:) from the customs clearance statistics of  MOE The difference 
between them is illustrated in figure 12.3, and this price difference (P," -  Pr) 
denotes the size of  the rents per pound of wool imported. This premium on 
imported wool is at least about 17 percent of its import price. If we denote the 
export price of wool products by %,  the allocation of the rents per pound of 
wool yam exported is 
. P: . (Py -  P:)/P:(=  R,). 
Similarly, the allocation of the rents per unit of spinning equipment is 
p . (Py - P:)/P: (=  R,) 
with the physical units adjusted. 
Figures 12.4 and 12.5 illustrate R, and the growth rate of wool yarn exports 
and R, and the increase in wool-spinning equipment, respectively. The data on 
exports and investment are taken from the customs clearance statistics of MOF 
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MITI. The rise in the growth rate of  exports in  1952-53  and the equipment 
increase in 1956 suggest a relation between the size of rents and exports and a 
relation between the size of rents and investment. 
12.5.3  Estimation of Export Function 
To test the former relation, we estimate a simple export function for wool 
yarn. In addition to R,,  other factors affecting the flow of exports must also be 
taken into account. Price and income variables, which are usually incorporated 
into an export function, are taken as ratios of foreign to domestic in this case 
because, in those days, the Japanese domestic market for wool products was 
blocked; that is, the foreign and domestic markets were separated. We  also 
take the U.S. market as the foreign market because the United States had the 
largest share in Japan's  exports of  wool yarn in most of  the periods under 
study.15 In addition to the above factors, the effects of other export promotion 
policies must be also considered. Here, we take into account only the financial 
export subsidy offered by the export advance bill system (  yushutsu maegashi 
tegata seido), one of the systems of  export priority financing in Japan. The 
reason is that a great amount of subsidies from that system flowed into trading 
companies, and into producers, if at all, through trading companies, and many 
major trading companies assumed important roles in exporting textile products 
in particular (Taisa 1989, 211-2).16 
To summarize, the dependent variable is export volume of wool yarn, and 
the independent variables are as follows: R,, the relative export price of wool 
yarn (pi;/e);  the ratio of U.S. GNP to Japanese GNP (NIJ");  and the rate of 
financial export subsidy by the advance bill system (sub). All the variables but 
the subsidy rate are transformed into the form of growth rates. The domestic 
price of wool yarn (pi;) is based on the wholesale price statistics of the Bank 
of  Japan, and the export price (e)  is available from the customs clearance 
statistics of MOF. GNP of the United States is quoted from U.S.  Department 
of Commerce (1986) and converted to yen at the official exchange rate ($1 = 
Y360).  GNP of  Japan is obtained from Economic Planning Agency (1965). 
With regard to the financial export subsidy, the subsidy rate is applied; it is the 
difference between the discount rate on Bank of Japan most favored commer- 
cial bills and that on Bank of Japan most favored export advance bills, both 
offered by commercial banks. Those data come from issues of the Economic 
Statistics Monthly (Bank of Japan). 
15. The choice of the United States as foreign market is in part due to the availability of data. 
Though the major destinations of wool yam exports in those days were the United States and some 
Asian countries, biannual data on national income for the latter countries are not available to us. 
Moreover, since a large share of exports to those Asian countries were via Hong Kong, it is impos- 
sible to construct an appropriate mixture of foreign income variables. 
16. In regard to export promotion, it is generally acknowledged that the Japanese government 
had various export promotion policy tools other than foreign exchange allocation (Itoh and Kiyono 
1988).  But there is also much difficulty in using sectoral and biannual data on those policy vari- 
ables. Further research in this direction would be of interest. 333  The Foreign Exchange Allocation Policy in Postwar Japan 
Table 12.8  Estimation of Export Function 
Adjusted 
Method  Rl  ele  NI,/NIj  sub  Constant  R2  D.W. 
Ordinary least  1.422***  1.982  -13.708  450.89  -964.73*  ,355  1.542 
squares  (3.014)  (0.335)  (-0.887)  (0.563)  (- 1.492) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
The results are displayed in table 12.8. The estimating method adopted is 
ordinary least squares."  The coefficient of R, is positive and statistically sig- 
nificant, as expected, while the coefficients of  relative price and relative in- 
come are insignificant. For the financial export subsidy, the sign of the coeffi- 
cient is positive but statistically insignificant.Is These results imply that the 
movement of wool yarn exports was basically determined by the size of allotted 
rents, not by the fundamental variables and not by the advance bill p01icy.'~ 
12.5.4  Estimation of Investment Function 
The investment effect of the allocation method based on production capacity 
cannot be tested simply by adding R,  to the usual independent variables of the 
investment function-profit  rate and interest rate-since  the size of rents af- 
fects the profit rate itself. Therefore, we first adjust the profit rate by extracting 
the value of rents due to R, from the profit itself, and then we regress invest- 
ment on the adjusted profit rate, the interest rate, and R,. 
We  assume the business profits plus depreciation expenses and the total 
assets of  the wool-spinning industry in Mitsubishi Economic Research Insti- 
tute (various years) to be profits and total assets.20  If we denote by  KY  equip- 
ment capacity, the value of rents due to R, is R,  *  KY. The adjusted profit rate is 
obtained by extracting R,  *  KY  from profits and dividing the residual by  total 
assets. 
Next, we regress investment on the adjusted profit rate (T),  R,,  and the inter- 
17. The only second-order serial correlation of residuals is found in ordinary least squares esti- 
mation, partly because of using biannual data. The following results do not change even when we 
assume those serial correlations by the Pagan (1974) method. It should be noted, however, that in 
this estimation, by using a poor income variable, the income effect is not well captured, thus some 
reservation must be shown in interpreting the results. 
18. Other formulas for the policy variables by that system, e.g., the total value of the subsidies, 
were also tested, but the results are similar. 
19. We also estimated an export function for wool fabrics. The result is quite similar to the one 
above, except the significance of the size of rents, R,,  is a bit weaker. The difference in the incen- 
tives of rents to those wool product exports is probably due to the fact that foreign exchange was 
allocated basically to wool-spinning firms, not to wool-weaving firms. 
20. Selection of sample firms is based on the availability of  both financial data and export and 
equipment capacity data at the firm level. Then we aggregate these data in each term. 334  Tetsuji Okazaki and Takafumi Korenaga 
Table 12.9  Estimation of Investment Function 
Method  7r  R2  i  Constant  Adjusted R2  D.W. 
Ordinary least  70.036***  105.66***  -  179.49  407.63  ,690  1.925 
Pagan (1974)  71.885***  107.94***  -  174.23  374.21  ,701  2.042 
squares  (4.04  1  )  (4.940)  (-1.351)  (0.688) 
(4.234)  (5.304)  (-1.350)  (0.662) 
Nore: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
est rate (i). The dependent variable is the increase in wool-spinning equipment. 
We  assume financial costs over the total liability with interest of  the wool- 
spinning industry to be i (Bank of Japan, various dates-c).,’ 
The results are exhibited in table 12.9. We  display two estimation results: 
ordinary least squares and Pagan’s (1974)  nonlinear least squares.22  The results 
are quite similar. The coefficient of R, is positive and statistically significant at 
the  1 percent level, while that of  T  is significant at the 5 percent level. The 
coefficients of the other variables are less significant statistically. It is notable 
that R, is of greater significance than T  in the investment decision, in a statisti- 
cal sense. This suggests that the effect of investment promotion was larger be- 
cause the allotment of rents was linked to equipment capacity. 
12.6  Concluding Remarks 
The foreign exchange allocation system functioned as  one of  the basic 
frameworks of  the Japanese economy until trade liberalization progressed in 
the first half of the 1960s. Most imports were subject to de facto control by the 
government through this system, and MITI used the system as a tool of indus- 
trial policy. Consequently, for many important goods, substantial rents were 
generated. It is notable that the existence of rents, their danger, and their utility 
were clearly recognized by  the people concerned. Therefore, MITI set clear 
and objective allocation criteria and committed to these criteria by announcing 
them publicly in order to restrain rent-seeking activities. This method caused 
competition for the allocation of rents among private enterprises. As criteria, 
export performance and production capacity were often adopted. The former 
was intentionally adopted as an export promotion measure, and its effect was 
quantitatively confirmed in the case of the wool-spinning industry. The latter 
had the effect of promoting investment not only by pushing up the profit rate 
21. When we take the user cost of capital as the cost variable, the main results do not change. 
22. The only second-order serial correlation of residuals is found in ordinary least squares esti- 
mation to some degree, which is statistically significant at the 20 percent significance level in the 
LM test proposed by  Breusch and Pagan (1980). We apply Pagan’s (1974) method by  assuming 
that serial correlation. While the correlation is partly due to using six-month data, researchers have 
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but also by linking the allocation of rents with equipment capacity. In short, 
the foreign exchange allocation system in postwar Japan promoted exports and 
investment by stimulating competition to acquire rents. 
To  the  above conclusions of  this paper,  certain qualifications should be 
added. First, the fact that the Japanese foreign exchange allocation system pro- 
moted exports and investment while restraining rent-seeking activities does 
not directly imply that the Japanese policy regime was the best and should be 
transmitted to present-day developing and transforming countries. The Japa- 
nese policy selection was made under historical conditions in which devalua- 
tion of the nominal exchange rate was difficult, there existed an effective bu- 
reaucracy and supporting private trade associations (Okazaki 1996), and so 
forth. Also we cannot deny that there were problems in the Japanese system. 
Unproductive rent-seeking activities did exist even in Japan, and as mentioned 
above, additional incentive to invest created excess capacity. Moreover, the ex- 
port link system had the effect of increasing the welfare of export companies 
and overseas consumers at the expense of domestic consumers.23 
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COIllmeIlt  Ronald I. McKinnon 
This careful study of a little-known part of Japanese history throws light on an 
important issue in development economics. To what extent can high growth in 
East Asian economies be attributed to astute government interventions in the 
early stages of economic development? In particular, was detailed foreign ex- 
change allocation by an incorruptible MITI in the 1950s to early 1960s essen- 
tial to Japan’s successful development as a great industrial exporter in the post- 
war period? 
The complex exchange allocation system, with different lists and eligibility 
criteria that Okazaki and Korenaga so carefully describe, was not instituted as 
part of a grand economic plan to spur economic development. Rather, it was 
an accidental outcome of the great inflation, macroeconomic instability, and 
(incipient) capital flight that Japan suffered in the late 1940s. In the successful 
Dodge stabilization of  1949, unifying the currency at 360 yen per dollar be- 
came the critically important nominal anchor for the Japanese price level. 
However valuable as a monetary anchor, the 360 yen rate was (perhaps ac- 
cidentally) somewhat overvalued. Despite strict controls on capital account, 
shortages of  foreign exchange persisted through the early and middle 1950s. 
Many key product prices-such  as that for basic steel-were  substantially 
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above those prevailing on world markets. As late as 1957, there was specula- 
tion that the yen  might be devalued-which  increased pressure for (covert) 
capital flight. Because it was not easy to make a distinction between current 
and capital account transactions, foreign exchange allocation, according to of- 
ficially specified import lists, became a necessity. 
According to Okazaki and Korenaga’s analysis, MITI distinguished an auto- 
matic approval (AA) list of imports permitted on a first come, first served basis. 
But subject to an overall foreign exchange budgetary limitation, there was also 
an FA list requiring detailed bureaucratic processing of each item. Liberaliza- 
tion took the form of letting the AA list grow in size relative to the FA list until 
more or less complete liberalization occurred in the early 1960s. After 1952, a 
decade or more of  deflationary pressure was necessary to allow the Japanese 
economy to “grow into” the exchange rate of 360 yen per dollar so that ex- 
change controls on current account could be relaxed in the 1960s. 
In the  1950s, however, economic rents from foreign exchange allocation 
were substantial, and who received them was (is) a matter of great interest to 
development economists. Despite the possibilities for moral hazard in the situ- 
ation, Okazaki and Korenaga show that MITI’s licensing procedures were insu- 
lated from political pressure on the one hand and corruption on the other-a 
feat that most developing countries would envy. More positively, they indicate 
two dominant criteria for allocating the rents: (1) inputs for exporters based on 
past or prospective export performance and (2) inputs to support underutilized 
investment capacity or new investment in certain areas-presumably  including 
tradable goods. 
If the yen was indeed overvalued, then this is precisely the allocation of rents 
one would want to compensate for that overvaluation. That is, the overvalu- 
ation tends to make exporting look unduly unprofitable and also tends to de- 
press  investment-particularly  in  tradables. Thus,  to  a  substantial extent, 
MITI’s allocation of economic rents pushed resource allocation in the Japanese 
economy closer to what would have occurred if the real exchange rate in the 
1950s had been correctly valued! By using foreign exchange allocations to 
promote exports on the one hand and investment on the other, MITI was simply 
compensating for the yen’s overvaluation. 
No doubt that MITI was reasonably clever, as well as incorruptible, in fol- 
lowing this rent allocation strategy. However, developing economies would 
hardly be advised to maintain overvalued currencies as a matter of deliberate 
policy in  order to put their industry ministries in the position of  allocating 
licenses for scarce foreign exchange over the whole range of  industrial and 
consumer imports. The result is much more likely to be serious decline in the 
efficiency of  the economy as rent seeking and corruption become rampant. 
This was documented in gory detail by Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger (1978) 
and further analyzed in McKinnon (1993). 
For successful economic development, the first-best strategy is to operate 
with a properly valued real exchange rate and to dispense with the elaborate 339  The Foreign Exchange Allocation Policy in Postwar Japan 
rent allocations that MITI so successfully undertook. In 1949,  Japan faced very 
special circumstances when a major inflation and multiple exchange rate re- 
gime had to be overcome with a stabilization program that was, to some extent, 
externally imposed, that is, the Dodge plan. The fact that MITI’s bureaucracy 
did very well in helping overcome the effects of currency overvaluation, which 
lasted almost a decade, is a tribute to Japan’s civil service. Nevertheless, this is 
a  second-best approach compared to maintaining an equilibrium exchange 
rate: Okazaki and Korenaga document some of its distortions by, for example, 
firms installing excess capacity because of the licensing procedures. The lesson 
for other developing countries is clear enough. In the 1950s, MITI’s astute 
allocation of import licenses helped to overcome much of the allocative distor- 
tion from an overvalued yen. However, currency overvaluation itself, while 
sometimes unavoidable, is not generally a desirable policy for promoting eco- 
nomic development. 
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Comment  Shinji Takagi 
I recently prepared a paper on substantially the same topic, namely, the Japa- 
nese system of foreign exchange and trade control in the 1950s and early 1960s 
(see Takagi 1997). Fortunately, however, my paper and Okazaki and Korena- 
ga’s  differ significantly in emphasis and purpose. While I emphasized how the 
system was used as a macroeconomic tool and was liberalized over time, the 
authors here emphasize how the system was used as a tool of industrial policy 
in allocating foreign exchange to different sectors of the economy. 
With my previous exposure to the topic, I must first point out that the system 
of foreign exchange allocation in Japan that Okazaki and Korenaga talk about 
was  never invariant throughout the period. Because regulations and institu- 
tional arrangements changed frequently, and many of these changes were un- 
important for the purpose of this study, it is indeed proper that the authors 
consider only the essential features of the system. The only problem, however, 
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comes from the fact that an intermediate category of goods was introduced into 
the import-licensing system in November 1959. The treatment of  this group 
of  goods, namely, those under the automatic fund allocation (AFA) system, 
should be made explicit in their discussions. 
It is also important to note that the Japanese system of foreign exchange and 
trade control was never introduced as a tool of industrial policy. It may well be 
true that the Japanese authorities came to use the system as such. However, the 
system was introduced as a response to a perceived need, namely, the need to 
cope with the economic reality of  the immediate post-World  War  I1 era in 
which the currencies of  most major countries remained inconvertible. Given 
the inconvertibility of most major currencies, including sterling, the Japanese 
authorities had to devise and maintain a system under which foreign exchange 
earnings in sterling, for example, could somehow be allocated to finance im- 
ports from the sterling area. 
Another important factor in the introduction and the operation of the system 
was the fact that Japan was a war-torn country with little production capacity 
for exports. It also took Japan years to establish normal commercial relation- 
ships with many of the world‘s leading economies. With the beginning of eco- 
nomic recovery and growth in the middle of the 1950s, Japan’s independence 
and subsequent entry in the International Monetary Fund and General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade, and the restoration of convertibility for most Euro- 
pean currencies in December 1958, however, the situation changed drastically. 
In the late 1950s, for example, the foreign exchange budget was routinely re- 
plenished when the ceiling was reached. It is thus not clear to what extent the 
import quotas or the foreign exchange allocation rules were binding in the 
latter part of  the author’s sample period. In this context, it is  striking that 
the estimated rents (in table 12.5) do not seem large. 
At least for the earlier period, the control procedures may have been binding, 
and there were probably potential rents to be exploited. An important contribu- 
tion of Okazaki and Korenaga’s has been to demonstrate quantitatively that the 
Japanese bureaucrats devised and then fairly strictly followed a foreign ex- 
change allocation rule based on export performance and production capacity. 
This is an important discovery, and it throws new  light on the never-ending 
debate about the role of the bureaucracy in the remarkable recovery and growth 
of the Japanese economy in the 1950s. Opinions differ as to the contribution 
of industrial policy and the bureaucracy in that process. Even the effectiveness 
of the allocation rule in promoting exports and investment can be questioned. 
Thanks to Okazaki and Korenaga’s work, however, one thing seems clear: the 
bureaucracy was not excessively corrupt in the implementation of that policy. 
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